tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.comments2023-05-13T07:41:26.217-05:00SOH-DanDaniel Lindquisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05443116324301716578noreply@blogger.comBlogger780125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-65723665891525810912016-08-07T19:19:19.484-05:002016-08-07T19:19:19.484-05:00I have read it. It has not gone unnoticed.I have read it. It has not gone unnoticed.J.A. Brownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06987967329943301151noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-48579916127606877712013-11-08T17:49:39.064-06:002013-11-08T17:49:39.064-06:00I'm sure I have more notes in a box somewhere,...I'm sure I have more notes in a box somewhere, but I'm not sure where.<br /><br />I do have some good news, though: His book is under contract with Harvard University Press, and my friend at UChicago says it looks like it actually will come out at some point. (I've seen the first ~100 pages in draft format.) Last I heard, the working title is "Active Thoughts" (and I believe it's already been cited a few times under that name).Daniel Lindquisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05443116324301716578noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-35718117853449140272013-11-08T16:56:19.516-06:002013-11-08T16:56:19.516-06:00Any more Kimhi notes to share? Took a course with...Any more Kimhi notes to share? Took a course with Kimhi, but I'd love to read more. I (and I'm sure many others) would love to get a glimpse at the work of this amazing thinker.ursusornatushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17841399307700092686noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-12190604043116520502013-06-10T21:08:54.108-05:002013-06-10T21:08:54.108-05:00Glad you enjoyed it, Lee.Glad you enjoyed it, Lee.Daniel Lindquisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05443116324301716578noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-4207657219763675712013-06-10T14:40:05.292-05:002013-06-10T14:40:05.292-05:00The third chapter of Markus Gabriel's book &qu...The third chapter of Markus Gabriel's book "Transcendental Ontology" has a fantastic discussion of Hegel's ontological logic and late Schelling's response to that. You should check it out. Also, this was a brilliant post, as usual.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06143511414329214999noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-56558273271408553772013-06-10T14:39:34.515-05:002013-06-10T14:39:34.515-05:00The third chapter of Markus Gabriel's book &qu...The third chapter of Markus Gabriel's book "Transcendental Ontology" has a fantastic discussion of Hegel's ontological logic and late Schelling's response to that. You should check it out. Also, this was a brilliant post, as usual.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06143511414329214999noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-29272271101803627242013-06-03T20:20:07.977-05:002013-06-03T20:20:07.977-05:00IIRC, the introduction to Kategorien des Zeitliche...IIRC, the introduction to Kategorien des Zeitlichen addresses (what Rödl sees as) the impoverishment of the concept of "logic" in latter days. The discussion isn't very in-depth, though.Ben Whttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06887096661154495898noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-6145985692676197982013-05-26T23:18:57.873-05:002013-05-26T23:18:57.873-05:00http://youtu.be/m8y8673RmII?t=52m30s
"Cognit...http://youtu.be/m8y8673RmII?t=52m30s<br /><br />"Cognitive science *needs* epistemology. Cognitive science needs a self-standing understanding of the epistemology of perceptual states on the lines of the position I'm representing as compulsory for its conceptual apparatus to be so much as intelligible."<br /><br />http://youtu.be/m8y8673RmII?t=54m14s<br /><br />"So it's only because the [representational] states are the topic for a different inquiry, epistemology... that cognitive science so much as has its topic."<br /><br />"The dependence of cognitive science on epistemology goes farther, or perhaps deeper, than that...."<br /><br />http://youtu.be/m8y8673RmII?t=59m54s<br /><br />"The cognitive science of perception owes its conceptual apparatus to its connection with epistemological ideas which have their credentials independently. There's a kind of priority to philosophical epistemology with equipping cognitive science with its apparatus."<br /><br />So, yes: I think there are things in this talk that are stronger than what someone like Alva Noe says. I think the kind of line you mention is the line he's been more inclined to push in earlier work, but this lecture seems to me to be different in this respect. (See for instance his attack on functionalism in "Functionalism and Anomalous Monism.")<br /><br />As to whether McDowell *needs* to be pushed this direction: well, if he wants to be entirely sanguine about representationalist-computationalist cognitive science in the way he is in this lecture, I think his arguing in this way makes sense. He noticeably *isn't* saying that there is "bad philosophy" in this kind of cognitive science, but his philosophical commitments prevent it from being able to give a self-standing account of representational purport (in the way that someone like Fodor wants it to), so I think he is more or less forced to say that cognitive science relies on an independent philosophy to provide it with its (representational) subject-matter. Noe doesn't have to say this because he can say that there is (in some sense) good philosophy, or at least good philosophical ideas, in cognitive science that's not in need of philosophical tidying-up -- what he wants to say about philosophy of perception etc. is both what he thinks is right on its own merits and what good cognitive science already is saying. Since McDowell doesn't want to tidy up the cognitive sciences, he has to deny that this bad philosophical stuff is in the science at all. So he's pushed to a picture of cognitive science as resting on an independent philosophy, as I quoted him saying above; and my closing question was, if this is the way he wants to push things, how much further he wants to go. (This is a real question, not any kind of rhetorical posturing or a reductio -- I don't know what he thinks about the Analogies of Experience and that sort of thing, and would be interested in finding out.)<br /><br />At least, so it seems to me; as I said, I probably am getting a somewhat atypical picture of this stuff from studying at IU. (One of my former office-mates is doing his dissertation on nonrepresentationalist cognitive science/philosophy of mind, specifically dynamic systems theory; he doesn't want to posit representations when dealing with rational thought. So, McDowell's ameliorist posture in this talk strikes me as rather dogmatic, which I'm sure is not what he wants it to be.)Daniel Lindquisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05443116324301716578noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-84222511291262589502013-05-26T22:47:29.780-05:002013-05-26T22:47:29.780-05:00From what I've seen, his discussion of the ph...From what I've seen, his discussion of the philosophy of logic is pretty strictly limited to Frege, Quine, some Wittgenstein, and some Kant commentators. He only looks at Dummett qua reader of Frege.<br /><br />But he does explicitly (on occasion) set aside topics as being things he just doesn't need to discuss for his purposes, and I think proof-theoretical stuff falls under that (or at least he would put it there). Insofar as "logic" designates something other than the study of the form of thought as such, which Roedl calls "metaphysical logic", he looks at it only to distinguish it from "metaphysical logic".<br /><br />Chapter one of "Categories of the Temporal" is where to look for this stuff; my post is pretty much just me trying to get clear on what Roedl's arguments in the last few pages of that chapter are. I'm only just now *finally* reading Roedl's books in their entirety; there's a reading group here for "Self-Consciousness", and I've now reread the first chapter of "Categories of the Temporal" enough times over the past six months that I feel like I can probably move on to the next chapter after one more go. (It's a dense book! But very good so far.)Daniel Lindquisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05443116324301716578noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-20951358073779127702013-05-26T17:38:06.827-05:002013-05-26T17:38:06.827-05:00A quick comment:
Again, I haven't seen the vi...A quick comment:<br /><br />Again, I haven't seen the videos yet. Nevertheless, do you think that McDowell's arguments need to be pushed into that direction? After all, perhaps he could be interpreted in a sense closer to (say) Alva Nöe, for whom philosophy should present a corrective to the <i>bad philosophy</i> which already "infects", in some sense, the otherwise good work of the scientists. In this sense, philosophy wouldn't provide a <i>basis</i> to science per se, but would merely restrain its flights into (bad) philosophy. Do you think that there is something which McDowell said in those lectures which could preclude this reading? Daniel Nagasehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09389957277629676271noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-63651296598906066512013-05-26T17:33:55.110-05:002013-05-26T17:33:55.110-05:00Hey, first of all, don't worry about replying ...Hey, first of all, don't worry about replying quickly. I myself am not the fastest "replier" around, and, as you said to me before, this kind of exchange is best when it's not made in a hurry.<br /><br />In any case, I have a simple question about Rödl. I haven't read his book yet (though I'm very interested in it!), but, from your description of it, it seems he opposes a certain strand in the philosophy of logic, which has its roots in Gentzen (and Dummett), and which tries to characterize the "province" of logic as being (basically) proof theory; according to this strand, logical constants, for example, would be completely characterized by their introduction and elimination rules. Does Rödl explicitly address this tradition? Or is more like a background discussion?Daniel Nagasehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09389957277629676271noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-14034718642530046972012-10-01T12:06:33.852-05:002012-10-01T12:06:33.852-05:00"They are distinguishables, not detachables; ..."They are distinguishables, not detachables; abstractables, not extractables..." Ryle, Letters and Syllables in Plato. (This in reaction to the longish paragraph on "Theaetetus".) <br /><br />The Context Principle, and the sign/symbol distinction of which it is inceptive, make the use/mention distinction problematic in various ways. <br /><br />http://kellydeanjolley.com/2011/08/24/quotable-and-unquotable-signs-peter-long/jollekdhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05743734210902639684noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-35189527145457272782012-08-26T19:56:32.850-05:002012-08-26T19:56:32.850-05:00I'm not going, however, to develop the applica...I'm not going, however, to develop the application of these to the case at hand, Kant's Table of Judgment. Some interesting suggestions to this effect are found in Allison, op. cit., pp.145-6, who apparently bases his account upon Wolff's treatment of the same topic.<br /><br />In any case, what this whole development leads us to is that there is, in fact, a principle that organizes Kant's exposition of the Table of Judgments. This principle is his account of judgment, together with additional assumptions about "what is requisite for a synthetic unity in general". Hence, I think it's fair to say that Kant's procedure is very far from the empirical "borrowing" that Hegel accuses him of (cf. Hegel's <i>Science of Logic</i>, p. 541). This is in partial agreement with your assessment: since it's only transcendental critique that can tell us what judgment is, the immediate consequence is that general logic is in part dependent on transcendental logic. But this does not mean that the structure of dependencies is a simple one; rather, I think Longuenesse is correct when she claims that Kant viewed both general and transcendental logic as mutually interdependent. This makes more sense of Kant's views of a system as an <i>organic</i> whole, I think, and also results in a much more defensible view of the Metaphysical Deduction, which, otherwise, is rendered almost incomprehensible. (For the relation between general and transcendental logic, see her very interesting introduction to part 2 of her <i>KCJ</i>, pp. 73-80) <br /><br />(Aside: about Hegel's critique of Kant on this precise point, I think matters are a bit more complicated. I don't see Hegel as pointing out a "gap" in Kant's exposition; rather, I see him as completely reversing Kant's position, a reversal that includes the relation between logic and ontology and, thus, it's not by chance that Kant's exposition of the forms that govern our thinking also comes under fire. This is shown, I think, by Hegel's own appropriation of Kant's table. After all, as Longuenesse highlights in her "Hegel on Kant on Judgment", for all his criticism of it, Hegel expounds his own Table of Judgments in the section on Judgment in the <i>Science of Logic</i> by taken his cue from Kant's own table, preserving its moments (though not its titles) in a basically unaltered form. In spite of this adherence to Kant's exposition, he nevertheless gives it a very different interpretation, taking it as exhibiting a <i>dynamic</i> progression of thought's own determinations from a simple, positive determination to its development in a more appropriate syllogistic inference. <br /><br />In other words, while Kant tried to display, through his table, an analysis of the rules which constitute every judgment as such (hence the adequateness of the tabular form, as Kant himself stresses), Hegel, on his part, is exhibiting the development of though itself. I think this is highly significant. It shows precisely how Hegel's criticism of Kant is more profound than a simple complaint about Kant's own exposition; it is a complaint directed at his method. Hence why I think it's unfair, both to Kant and Hegel, to see the latter as merely filling in a gap in the former's exposition. Kant's exposition, by his lights, is complete. There's no need to "complete" it by other, <i>further</i> considerations. Which, of course, does not impede us of preferring other expositions than his.)Daniel Nagasehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09389957277629676271noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-59900835023189457352012-08-26T19:53:57.586-05:002012-08-26T19:53:57.586-05:00I think those cases are special precisely because ...I think those cases are special precisely because of their relation to transcendental logic (here, Brandt has interesting suggestions: cf. his <i>The Table of Judgments</i>, p. 78). Following Longuenesse's wording (in chap. 4 of her <i>Kant on the Human Standpoint</i>, p. 99), singular judgment is a form that "allows special consideration of individual objects", while infinite judgment considers "their relation to a conceptual space that is indefinitely determinable", where this conceptual space is specified by the relations of subordination between concepts, thus allowing for their systematization under the form of disjunctive judgments. Finally, they're also inferentially articulated with other judgments, resulting in the fourth heading, that of Modality: as Kant explains (cf. explanation number 4 of the ones referred to above), a judgment derives its modal status from its place in an inference. Problematic judgments are those, e.g., that function as components judgments in hypothetical and disjunctive judgments; assertoric judgments are taken as minor premises of a syllogism; and its conclusion is apodeitically determined (relative to its conditions, obviously). (Kant also connects Modality with Method, but I admit that this connection is not entirely clear to me. About this, again, Brandt has some interesting remarks: cf. the aforementioned book, pp. 82-3)<br /><br />On a final note, one may ask, is it a coincidence that, under each heading, we find a trichotomous division of moments? Here, Allison, following Wolff, points to an interesting passage by Kant, in the Introduction to the <i>Critique of the Power of Judgment</i>, in which he answers in the negative:<br /><br />"It has been thought suspicious that my divisions in pure philosophy almost always turn out to be threefold. But that is in the nature of the matter. If a division is to be made <i>a priori</i>, then it will either be <b>analytic</b>, in accordance with the principle of contradiction, and then it is always twofold (<i>quodlibet ens est aut A aut non A</i>). Or it is <b>synthetic</b>; and if in this case it is to be derived from <b>concepts</b> <i>a priori</i> (not, as in mathematics, from the <i>a priori</i> intuition corresponding to the concept), then, in accordance with what is requisite for synthetic unity in general, namely (1) a condition, (2) something conditioned, (3) the concept that arises from the unification of the conditioned with its condition, the division must necessarily be a trichotomy." (KU, 5:197n)Daniel Nagasehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09389957277629676271noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-83432332852770734542012-08-26T19:52:48.834-05:002012-08-26T19:52:48.834-05:00Interestingly, the above analysis also buttresses ...Interestingly, the above analysis also buttresses Kant's claim that all acts of the understanding are contained in his Table of Judgments. This is because Kant's notion of condition, together with his extensional theory of concept subordination, ties his account of judgment very nicely with his syllogistic doctrine. Roughly put, his extensional account of concept subordination means that every judgment is a potential major premise in a syllogism that attributes the predicate-concept to the objects (or marks) that fall under the subject-concept. To use Kant's example, when one judges that "All bodies are divisible", this furnishes us with the major premise of a syllogism such as "All bodies are divisible; now, this x is a body; therefore, this x is divisible". Or, again, "All bodies are divisible; now, every metal is a body; therefore, every metal is divisible". This means that every judgment can be located in a potential syllogistic chain, which is precisely what is captured by Kant's concept of <i>condition</i>. The concept of "metal", for example, is the condition in the judgment "Every metal is divisible", insofar as it's subsumable under the concept "body"; on the other hand, this means that the concept "body" is also the "ultimate" reason for that judgment, as it is what "ultimately" provides the reason for attributing to the subject the mark "divisible" (I put "ultimate" between scare quotes to indicate the relative function of this term, for the syllogistic chain may be pursued further, i.e. one can say that the condition for the attribution of the concept of divisibility to the concept of a body is composition, such as in the judgment "All bodies are composite"). In other words, the condition of a judgment is a condition only because of its relation to a further condition, which also derives its function from another condition, and so on, thus locating every judgment in a syllogistic chain that may be extended in both directions (cf. Longuenesse, pp. 90-93).<br /><br />This connection of judgment with syllogism also shows how organically connected is Kant's philosophy. If every judgment is a potential major premise in a syllogistic inference, and this is derived precisely from the notion of its condition, then we can expect to find the syllogistic doctrine "encased", as it were, in the Table of Judgments. And, lo and behold, that's precisely what we find: the three moments of Relation, namely, categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments, are also what define the three main types of syllogism in Kant's doctrine (which, in this respect, doesn't depart much from the logical tradition of his time), namely, categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms.<br /><br />Anyway, let's recap what we have seen so far. I claimed, following Longuenesse, that Kant's Table of Judgment could be given a derivation taking it's clue from the precise definition of judgment that Kant gives in §19 of the <i>Critique</i>, that is, "a judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception." We saw how this could be developed into the idea that a judgment is a subordination of concepts (which gave us the titles of quantity and quality ) under a determinate condition (which gave us the title of relation). My analysis, however, privileged the first two moments under each heading, leaving out the third moment (respectively, singular, infinite, and disjunctive judgments), as well as the title of modality. As Kant himself remarks, these are "special" cases, and must thus be dealt with separately (that's why he devotes separate explanations to each of them; cf. the passages that immediately follow the Table of Judgments, A71-6/B96-101).Daniel Nagasehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09389957277629676271noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-6400270391609343042012-08-26T19:51:35.695-05:002012-08-26T19:51:35.695-05:00As an aside, if the analysis presented so far is c...As an aside, if the analysis presented so far is correct, it has some interesting consequences. First, it corroborates Manley Thompson's interesting suggestions (in "Singular terms and intuition in Kant's epistemology") to the effect that "had Kant known quantificational logic, he would have recognized 'Fx' as a representing the form of predication and would have seen that the corresponding relation in his transcendental logic (epistemology) is that of a concept to an object" (p. 334). I think this is correct as far as it goes, except for being expressed as a counterfactual. True, Kant didn't know quantificational logic. Nevertheless, as it is clear from the above, he already had the resources to capture the relations Thompson thinks he should have captured. This, in turn, supports Thompson's claim that concepts, for Kant, should be regarded as open sentences, with their different uses (Thompson is here thinking of their different uses in universal, particular, or singular judgments) corresponding to different quantifications of open sentences (cf. p. 323). I would also add, following Longuenesse, that a judgment for Kant always involves a conditional, so that the appropriate formalization of a categorical judgment (say, "All bodies are divisible") would be "(x) (Bx --> Dx), whereas the appropriate formalization of an hypothetical judgment (say, "if bodies are composite, then they are divisible") would be "(x)[(Bx & Cx) --> Dx]", where the "Cx" represents precisely the <i>added condition</i> to be fulfilled. As she concludes: "This presentation of Kant's categorical and hypothetical judgments shows that the <i>formal</i> difference between them is merely a difference in the <i>complexity of the relation of condition to conditioned</i>. The two thoughts considered here under the heading of relation can both be formalized as uses of the <i>conditional</i> connective, combined with conjunction in one case and not in the other." (p. 103n53)Daniel Nagasehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09389957277629676271noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-55834686432549309512012-08-26T19:49:09.215-05:002012-08-26T19:49:09.215-05:00But that's not all. Merely concept subordinat...But that's not all. Merely concept subordination is still insufficient to relate given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception, since conceptual unity, as such, does not yet refer to objects (i.e. a concept is not true or false). So, as Reich argues (in pp. 49-51 of the aforementioned study), for a judgment to take place, there is need of "an additional <i>given condition</i> of its [viz. a given concept] employment for the cognition of an object" (p. 50, original emphasis). In other words, reference to truth is intrinsic to the function of judgment as such; it's what distinguishes a judgment (e.g. "All bodies are extended") from a mere conceptual unity (e.g. "extended body"). If this analysis is correct, then reference to the truth conditions are also essential to a judgment. To put it another way, judgment is not merely an act of concept subordination, but is also an <i>assertion under a condition</i>. Hence, a judgment must also make reference to the <i>relation</i> between an assertion and its condition. This relation can be an <i>internal</i> relation, in which the subject is considered as a sufficient reason for the assertion of the predicate (contra Brandt, who inverts the direction of the determination), or an <i>external</i> relation, in which the predicate is asserted of the subject under some added condition. The first relation gives us categorical judgments, the second hypothetical judgments. <br /><br />Incidentally, it's important not to confuse this <i>logical</i> considerations with <i>ontological</i> considerations. That is, the determination of the relation between an assertion and its condition is an act of thought, and thus specifies essentially different, non-reducible logical forms. To incur into this confusion is precisely the mistake made, first by Wolff, and later by Eberhard, when he assimilated Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments to Wolff's distinction between predications with and without added conditions.Daniel Nagasehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09389957277629676271noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-60831213962213229652012-08-26T19:45:46.615-05:002012-08-26T19:45:46.615-05:00Kant's answer, which he had expounded in the M...Kant's answer, which he had expounded in the Metaphysical Deduction, is "by means of an analytic unity" (B105). I agree with Longuenesse here that we should follow Klaus Reich lead (see especially chap. 3 of <i>The Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments</i>) and identify this "analytic unity" with the analytic unity of consciousness, as explained by Kant in §16 of the Deduction, in particular B133-4 and the footnote appended to this passage. There, Kant explains that this analytic unity, as "the identity of the consciousness in these representations" ("these representations", namely the manifold of representations given to me), is the unity that attaches to all concepts <i>qua</i> concepts. This explanation, in turn, needs to be read in light of what Kant said previously in the beginning of the Clue Chapter (A68-9/B93-4), where we find a very concise explanation of the function of judgment. This makes clear that judgment achieves its function (of relating representations to objects) by means of <i>concept subordination</i>. As Kant himself explains (this passage is, I think, worthy quoting in full):<br /><br />"In every judgment there is a concept that holds of many, and that among this many also comprehends a given representation, which is then related immediately to the object. So in the judgment, e.g., '<b>All bodies are divisible</b>', the concept of the divisible is related to various other concepts; among these, however, it is here particularly related to the concept of body, and this in turn is related to certain appearances that come before us. These objects are therefore mediately represented by the concept of divisibility. All judgments are accordingly functions of unity among our representations, since instead of an immediate representation a higher one, which comprehends this and and other representations under itself [namely, analytic unity -- D. N.] , is used for the cognition of the object, and many possible cognitions are thereby drawn together into one ['drawn together', i.e. synthesized -- D.N.]." (A68-9/B93-4)<br /><br />Hence, a judgment such a "All bodies are divisible" can actually be developed as "To every <i>x</i>, to which the concept 'body' belongs, belongs also the concept 'divisible'" (Following Kant's lead in the <i>Jäsche Logic</i>, §36). In other words, as the reference to appearances in the above quotation makes clear, in a judgment, not only are the marks of a given concept attributed to another concept, but the extension of a concept is also thought under the extension of the other (that's why Kant says that "These objects [i.e. the appearances] are therefore mediately represented by the concept of divisibility"]). Thus, it's possible to already derive two of the Titles: Quantity and Quality. That is, <i>if</i> one considers that the function of judgment is to relate given cognitions to an object by means of an act of concept subordination, in which the extensions of the concepts in play are also taken into account, <i>then</i>, as the above consideration shows, one must take into account the <i>quantity</i> of the extension of the concepts (are we dealing with <i>all</i> or <i>some</i> of the objects that fall under the concept?), as well as the <i>quality</i> of the logical subordination that is established (are we subsuming the extension of one concept under another, or, on the contrary, are we excluding one from the other?). It's possible then to see how Quantity and Quality are so many moments which determine this original act of concept subordination.Daniel Nagasehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09389957277629676271noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-39134301649395607952012-08-26T19:43:49.335-05:002012-08-26T19:43:49.335-05:00With regards to Tolley's essay, first of all, ...With regards to Tolley's essay, first of all, thanks for the pointer. I hadn't read that essay yet (though I had read others from the same volume), and, although I'm not entirely convinced by Tolley's argumentation, he does build a very interesting case against what he calls "the normative interpretation". In the very least, it raises important questions that should be addressed. I'll have to return to it in the near future, in order to better clarify my own views on the topic.<br /><br />As for Longuenesse, this may be my own particular view, but I think her book is best read as a whole. One of her most impressive feats, in my opinion, is to display very vividly the organic unity of Kant's <i>Critique</i>. She shows, in a convincing manner, how Kant builds one intricate argument throughout the Analytic, in which each part of the argument is progressively clarified as the argument develops. I personally found it a very beautiful exposition, extremely powerful. I think the only other Kantian commentary which caused a similar impact on me was Strawson's, but for different reasons. <br /><br />Anyway, moving on to Kant's Table of Judgments. You claim, in your reply, that, although it's true that transcendental philosophy can provide us with a more adequate explanation of judgment, this explanation by itself is not sufficient to derive Kant's Table of Judgments. Moreover, you also claim that this insufficiency is actually buttressed by Kant's own statements to the effect that we are "incapable of further explaining... why we have just these and no other forms of judgment" (B145-6). Well, I (obviously!) disagree, in both accounts. Starting with Kant's statement, I am here in agreement with Allison (who appears to be agreeing with Michael Wolff), when he emphasizes that the important element in that sentence is "further", i.e. we are incapable of <i>further</i> explaining...", that is, of giving an explanation <i>in addition to the the one already given</i>, namely, the unity of apperception. In other words, as Allison highlights, Kant is not saying that <i>no</i> ground can be given, only that no <i>further</i> ground can be given. If this is so, however, the next question is: how is this derivation possible, then?<br /><br /><br />Well, to offer a thorough explanation would be rather laborious, but I think the basics of it are easy to grasp (for a more detailed treatment, check out Allison's own summary of Wolff's treatment of the topic, in his <i>Kant's Transcendental Idealism</i>, 2 ed., pp. 133-151; the argument for the completeness proper is found in pp. 135-146; check out also chapter 4 of Longuenesse's <i>Kant and the Capacity to Judge</i>). Kant defines judgments, in §19, as "nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the <b>objective</b> unity of apperception" (B141). This definition is of utmost importance, I think, for it provides the precise function of judgments: to reflect the synthesis of the manifold (the given cognitions) in a higher synthesis (judgment itself) which relates those cognitions to an <i>object</i>. This definition is highly significant, as it makes objectivity (in the sense of a purporting to be about objects) an intrinsic feature of judgment, as well as a norm that govern its employment. How, however, is this objectifying function achieved?Daniel Nagasehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09389957277629676271noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-65865637007531318832012-08-26T19:41:29.410-05:002012-08-26T19:41:29.410-05:00With regards to Tolley's essay, first of all, ...With regards to Tolley's essay, first of all, thanks for the pointer. I hadn't read that essay yet (though I had read others from the same volume), and, although I'm not entirely convinced by Tolley's argumentation, he does build a very interesting case against what he calls "the normative interpretation". In the very least, it raises important questions that should be addressed. I'll have to return to it in the near future, in order to better clarify my own views on the topic.<br /><br />As for Longuenesse, this may be my own particular view, but I think her book is best read as a whole. One of her most impressive feats, in my opinion, is to display very vividly the organic unity of Kant's <i>Critique</i>. She shows, in a convincing manner, how Kant builds one intricate argument throughout the Analytic, in which each part of the argument is progressively clarified as the argument develops. I personally found it a very beautiful exposition, extremely powerful. I think the only other Kantian commentary which caused a similar impact on me was Strawson's, but for different reasons. <br /><br />Anyway, moving on to Kant's Table of Judgments. You claim, in your reply, that, although it's true that transcendental philosophy can provide us with a more adequate explanation of judgment, this explanation by itself is not sufficient to derive Kant's Table of Judgments. Moreover, you also claim that this insufficiency is actually buttressed by Kant's own statements to the effect that we are "incapable of further explaining... why we have just these and no other forms of judgment" (B145-6). Well, I (obviously!) disagree, in both accounts. Starting with Kant's statement, I am here in agreement with Allison (who appears to be agreeing with Michael Wolff), when he emphasizes that the important element in that sentence is "further", i.e. we are incapable of <i>further</i> explaining...", that is, of giving an explanation <i>in addition to the the one already given</i>, namely, the unity of apperception. In other words, as Allison highlights, Kant is not saying that <i>no</i> ground can be given, only that no <i>further</i> ground can be given. If this is so, however, the next question is: how is this derivation possible, then?<br /><br />Well, to offer a thorough explanation would be rather laborious, but I think the basics of it are easy to grasp (for a more detailed treatment, check out Allison's own summary of Wolff's treatment of the topic, in his <i>Kant's Transcendental Idealism</i>, 2 ed., pp. 133-151; the argument for the completeness proper is found in pp. 135-146; check out also chapter 4 of Longuenesse's <i>Kant and the Capacity to Judge</i>). Kant defines judgments, in §19, as "nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the <b>objective</b> unity of apperception" (B141). This definition is of utmost importance, I think, for it provides the precise function of judgments: to reflect the synthesis of the manifold (the given cognitions) in a higher synthesis (judgment itself) which relates those cognitions to an <i>object</i>. This definition is highly significant, as it makes objectivity (in the sense of a purporting to be about objects) an intrinsic feature of judgment, as well as a norm that govern its employment. How, however, is this objectifying function achieved?Daniel Nagasehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09389957277629676271noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-40681136318383778072012-08-13T23:02:34.624-05:002012-08-13T23:02:34.624-05:00"On the contrary, it's transcendental phi..."On the contrary, it's transcendental philosophy which establishes the precise function of judgment (as per §19 of the Transcendental Deduction) and its relation to thought in general (as per §10, the [in]famous Metaphysical Deduction), thus establishing the basis on which the forms of judgment will be considered. Once these forms of judgment have been established, then the categories can be derived."<br /><br />I think Kant sees himself as establishing less than he would need to produce the Table of Judgements, and that Fichte and Hegel are correct in seeing this as a gap. By Kant's own lights, we are "incapable of further explaining... why we have just these and no other forms of judgement" (B145/6, close of §21), and it is just this that is complained about. You are correct that Kant thinks it is part of transcendental philosophy to say what judgement <i>qua</i> judgement is, what it is to have a "logical form": this is what he accuses previous logicians as not addressing, in §19. But Kant's own answer is very general, and does not suffice for deriving even the four headings Quality/Quantity/Relation/Modality, to say nothing of the four moments that fall under them. Kant's principle of logical form (bringing concepts to the objective unity of apperception) does not suffice for deriving the table of (general) logical forms -- and he asserts dogmatically that no principle can do better, even though he somehow has arrived at just these forms, and never doubts that he has listed all of them. This is just what the post-Kantians complain about, and try to remedy.<br /><br />"Incidentally, I would like to, once again, thank you for maintaining this very good blog. As always, your posts provide me with great food for thought, which is not something I can often say. In this sense, I hope this reply can come as a way of furthering the inquire in a friendly manner, and not as confrontational! "<br /><br />I am glad you like it.<br /><br />Thanks for continuing to comment; getting spurred into rethinking things and having to find clearer ways to present my thoughts are just what I want out of blogging. I have of course taken your comments in the fashion you wished; but even if they <i>were</i> meant to be confrontational, then so long as they genuinely served to further inquiry my pragmatist heart could not say "no" to them.<br /><br />I will note, though, that my semester is about to begin: blogging will probably become sparse again soon. So if it takes me a while to reply to comments, that is probably why. (It would also help if I didn't always write such long multi-part comments, but I don't think that can change.)Daniel Lindquisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05443116324301716578noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-34256272817688554922012-08-13T23:02:03.477-05:002012-08-13T23:02:03.477-05:00I don't think Kant can have McDowell's vie...I don't think Kant can have McDowell's views on empirical concepts, because McDowell is explicit that we arrive at some of our empirical concepts by being "trained up" in language: they aren't all derived from experience (in the way he discusses in "Avoiding"), even though they're the sort of concept which could have been. So McDowell doesn't face the problem I (and Fichte) see Kant facing: he is already taking on board the idea that some of any particular individual's empirical concepts were not formed by that individual in the way that she can go on to form further empirical concepts, but were formed in the original process that lead to that individual becoming a thinker at all. There's no space in McDowell's picture for an abstractionist account of how those concepts were formed, of either Locke's or Longuenesse's sort: it just so happens that in coming to be the thinker I am, I became empirically aware of e.g. mama and kitties, because I first learned to talk (to think) by being trained to reliably respond in disinct ways to mama and kitties in the way that leads infant humans to become minded. All of my judging/thinking/speaking begins from some such store of empirical concepts. The social origins of mentality are thus important, as it is this original context which provides a thinker with empirical concepts: they are equiprimordial with his being a thinker at all. Kant still has a Cartesian tendency to think of an individuals's mental capacities as explicable purely on their own basis, which I think blinds him to this. But I think McDowell's views actually fit better with Kant's views in the section on definitions you quoted than Kant's own: if Kant denies there is any final end to empirical concept formation (except as an ideal), why should there be any definite starting point for empirical concept formation? Why not embrace the idea that with empirical concepts, we are never otherwise than <i>in medias res</i>, revising the empirical concepts we find ourself with?<br /><br />I don't see how transcendental idealism can help Kant out here.Daniel Lindquisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05443116324301716578noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-15880782455468150452012-08-13T23:01:39.908-05:002012-08-13T23:01:39.908-05:00(cont.)
"In other words, we never simply abs...(cont.)<br /><br />"In other words, we never simply abstract a concept from given sensations, but rather produce one in the context of experience, understood here as a system of interconnected perceptions. It is this system that enables me, in order to produce a certain concept, to privilege certain marks and abstract from others, guiding my activity of comparison."<br /><br />It is clear that Kant wants part of his picture to work in the following way: I do not form empirical concepts by "copying" a form that is present in the items presented to me, which I then use as a component in judgements. Rather, I only go through the process of comparison/reflection/abstraction once I am already presented with some determinate individuals, and the way that I compare/reflect/abstract is up to me (and nature does not tell me how to do it). But I think this is exactly how Locke thinks of it. After all, Locke's abstractionism is an attempt to explain how we arrive at *general* ideas, not how we arrive at ideas at all; like Kant, he presumes we are already presented with determinate individuals, and can compare and reflect and abstract in different ways. As you are (Longuenesse is) spelling Kant's theory out, the Jasche Logic passage seems to line up very closely with Locke's account in Essay III.iii.7, which is just as Fichte accused. The problem is just *how* experience can enable me to "privilege certain marks and abstract from others" unless I already possess (empirical) concepts which I can bring to bear to articulate what it is that is given to me in experience. In Locke's case we have a paradigm instance of the Myth of the Given; as you present it, I don't see how Kant (Longuenesse) fares any better.<br /><br />You'll have to spell out what you see the Remark you quote in the final paragraph of your second comment as coming to. I remember Longueness talking about this sort of thing, and finding it terribly obscure how any of it was supposed to help her view out.Daniel Lindquisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05443116324301716578noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-3826317227424778302012-08-13T23:01:06.320-05:002012-08-13T23:01:06.320-05:00(cont.)
(I also think it's doubtful that Kant...(cont.)<br /><br />(I also think it's doubtful that Kant was trying to give a merely normative account in the Jasche Logic, because I don't think Kant has a normative view of logic at all: logic tells us what it is to think, not what it is to think *well*. If we violate a "norm" of logic, we simply cease thinking; we don't do something that could stand in need of correction by cleaving to a norm. Clinton Tolley's "Kant on the Nature of Logical Laws" finally convinced me that this is in fact Kant's view of the matter, with ample textual evidence. But Tolley also has to face many passages where it looks like Kant *does* have a normative conception of logic, which he has convincingly showed Kant cannot have. Tolley's final judgement is that Kant likely slipped into thinking of logic in the way others had before him, normatively, out of habit. I see Fichte making the same objection re: empirical concept formation: Kant simply cannot have coherently been an abstractionist, but he endorsed abstractionism out of inertia -- and this inertia also kept him from seeing that he simply had no account on offer of empirical concept formation.)<br /><br />"I think this is important because it shows that, for Kant, concept formation is not an activity which produces a definite result, but is rather a never ending process of refinement. "<br /><br />This is ambiguous. In one sense it is correct: Kant doesn't believe we can reach a "final" set of empirical concepts (since the ideal of such a thing is merely regulative), so in that sense the process does not produce a <i>definite</i> result.<br /><br />But in another sense it is false: Kant does think we have empirical concepts, and so we must have produced them in some way. The concepts we use in such judgements are up for replacement: As Kant says, what use would a definition of "water" be? Any such concept we have is merely used to direct our attention to certain further experiments, whose results might lead us to discard the old concept of "water" and form a new one, with different characteristics. But for a given empirical concept to be up for replacement, we have to *have* it: the endless process of empirical concept formation is not uniformly smooth, but has us forming concepts, using them, and then forming new concepts (by piecemeal revision of our old ones, usually). The section on definitions you pointed to is only about these latter stages, not the original process in which we first are able to form empirical concepts.Daniel Lindquisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05443116324301716578noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8042142443470259188.post-86045651481323777352012-08-13T23:00:08.689-05:002012-08-13T23:00:08.689-05:00I have read long stretches of Longuenesse's &q...I have read long stretches of Longuenesse's "Capacity to Judge" book several times, when people have pointed me to it; I never seem to see what gets people excited about it. Allen Wood likes it a lot, too. (FWIW, I took a lot away from her Hegel book. So I don't think it's an issue of her writing style, or anything like that.)<br /><br />"Anyway, in regards to the first topic, I think that Kant's views only approach Locke if you read the account in the Jäsche Logic in isolation from the rest of his views. Specifically, I think it's impossible to consider it a purely abstractionist view once one considers the primacy that Kant accords to judgment and also his transcendental idealism. "<br /><br />Well, the issue then is to give a reading of the Jasche passage such that it is coherent with these other Kantian views. It certainly <i>looks</i> like Locke. And it certainly <i>looks</i> like Kant giving an account of where we get empirical concepts, which he is otherwise oddly silent on in his published works.<br /><br />"staying true to his motto that the form always precede the matter"<br /><br />Where does Kant state this "motto"? I would've thought his view was a more Aristotelian one: what is primary are form-matter composites, and neither "pure form" nor "pure matter" is given. You can arrive at either only by abstraction (in thought), not by extraction (which would give you just a form or just a matter).<br /><br />"Analysis of experience, with an aim to form concepts, thus consists, for Kant, in the formation of "silent judgments" (the comparison, reflection, and abstraction that he mentions in the Jäsche Logic..."<br /><br />I don't see how this solves the problem. How can I form "silent judgements" to the effect of "Disregarding the leaves and trunk, there is something these substances have in common..." (or however the "silent judgement" is supposed to run), without already having empirical concepts like "leaves" and "trunk"? According to the view you present (Longuenesse's), it looks like I have to already have empirical concepts to form empirical concepts. Or else "marks" have to be something which are not empirical concepts, and which present things which can be "noticed" in experience without the use of empirical concepts, but which seem to do just the work that empirical concepts do. And then (what Longuenesse calls) "empirical concepts" are just the coming-to-full-awareness of these things, which look like they were always already everything that empirical concepts were supposed to be. So the real issues are just pushed back a step: now the question is how I can have the relevant capacities to apprehend the marks which I (silently, unconsciously) make use of in forming empirical concepts, given that it looks like these capacities are nothing but (empirical) conceptual capacities.<br /><br />FWIW, this is not the reading of the Jasche passage Allen Wood gave when I asked him about it. He suggested that in the Jasche Logic Kant is concerned not with saying how we do form empirical concepts, but with how we *should* form them: we should form them by a process of comparing, reflecting, and abstracting, so that we will end up with concepts which stand in clear hierarchical relations to one another etc. And then when I asked him what Kant's actual theory of empirical concept formation was, he could only point me to Longuenesse. Who seems to me to not grasp the real problem.Daniel Lindquisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05443116324301716578noreply@blogger.com