Showing posts with label Locke Lectures. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Locke Lectures. Show all posts

21 December 2007

Brandom Lectures Update

The full audio of Brandom's fifth lecture, along with the reply and the full Q&A section, has been posted to the place the old version was at. I figure this is of interest to some, and wouldn't want it to get buried in an old comment thread.

Hopefully I'll get around to listening to the full version (and the final lecture) sometime before the sun becomes a cold, dark lump of coal the size of your forehead. But no promises!

edit: I have listened to the full version, and have started working through Priest's "An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic". Which has been my first formal introduction to modal logic (though I was of course not entirely ignorant of the stuff before now, my "Logic" course didn't go past the predicate calculus, so I'd been neglecting actually sitting down and working textbook problems for anything more than that). I get what Brandom's been saying about "the modal revolution" now; this stuff is neat.

I'm not sure how much Brandom's claims about "the intrinsic logic" of e.g. intuitionist logic being classical S5 really amount to. The claim seems to boil down to saying that for any autonomous discursive practice, even one in which "Not not A, ergo A" doesn't generally hold as a form of valid inference, you can say how to draw inferences according to classical S5 rules; any autonomous language game is VV-sufficient for laying out classical S5's inferential rules through a semantics that speaks only of commitment and entitlement. But this does not strike me as particularly impressive; there would still be inferences in the discursive practice whose form classical S5 would countenance which the discursive practitioners would not recognize as valid, so it strikes me as odd to say that the "intrinsic logic" of the discursive practice is classical S5. Whatever purpose "intrinsic" logic serves, it doesn't seem to have much of a relation to the inferences reasoners draw, and so it seems like a rather beggarly "intrinsic" feature of their practice. If logic isn't behind the validity of inferences, I don't see what it can be said to do at all.

I don't think there's anything here that Brandom would disagree with; he said in an earlier lecture that he doesn't think the question of "Which is the true logic" is a good one, since various logics can be used to express various sorts of inferential commitments. But then I'm left wondering what calling classical S5 "the intrinsic logic of most familiar logics" is supposed to mean, if it's not supposed to be calling classical S5 "more true" than other logics -- more closely related to our inferential practices, or somesuch. For instance, on page 2 of the lecture handout:

Fact: The incompatibility semantics over standard incompatibility relations with these semantic definitions of connectives validates classical propositional logic.
What is that supposed to mean, if we're not interested in the question of "Which is the true logic"? In what sense can classical propositional logic be "validated" short of being "the true logic"? Is this supposed to be an explanation for why classical logic came along so early, and has been so widely-liked, or something like that? (If so, it strikes me as a bad effort -- classical logic has simple truth-tables, and both "the law of excluded middle" and "the law of noncontradiction" have the support of Aristotle (and most of the tradition), which I think nicely accounts for why non-classical logics always smell a little fishy. But I suspect Brandom doesn't mean to be addressing this question, either. I just don't know what "intrinsic logic" is supposed to signify. Perhaps he's claiming that classical S5 can be worked out purely from talk of commitment and entitlement (and not of truth etc.)? But then I still don't see why "intrinsic logic" should be a good title for this feature of classical S5.)

This is to set to the side that, as I understand it, paraconsistent logics don't have classical S5 as their "intrinsic logic". Whatever the "validation" of classical logic is supposed to amount to, I suspect that this is a serious barrier to it.

On a more positive note: I liked the stuff about holism. Fodor comes under attack from yet another front; suits me fine. I am curious what Brandom's argument for holism entails for a Tarski-style theory of truth (along Davidsonian lines), since in a Tarski-style theory the truth-conditions of a sentence are derived from semantic properties assigned to sub-sentential units, that of satisfaction; the satisfaction relations are the axioms from which the familiar T-sentences are drawn as theorems. Tarski-style theories of truth are compositional. (I think I have this right; I should probably go back and read some of the earlier Davison essays to brush up on this.) Brandom's semantics is not compositional, though it is recursive. "It is holistic, that is, noncompositional, in that the semantic value of a compound is not computable from the semantic values of its components. But this holism within each level of constructional complexity is entirely compatible with recursiveness between levels. The semantic values of all the logically compound sentences are computable entirely from the semantic values of less complex sentences." I suspect that this is not a difference which makes a difference. The Tarskian details that lie behind Davidson's "Convention T" do not seem to play much of a role in the interpretive process; ""S" is true-in-L IFF P, where "P" is a translation of "S" into English, or simply S if L=English" does not seem to need any adjusting if one mucks around with the axiom system Tarski used; McDowell argues in one of his essays ("In Defense of Modesty"?) that intuitionists can make use of a Tarski-style theory of truth as a theory of meaning despite their disagreements about logic, contra Dummett & Wright, and I should think the same holds here: The important part of "Convention T" remains unassailable, though some of the things Davidson wrote about compositionality might need revising.

11 November 2007

Pragmatically Moe-diated Semantic Relations

I am only making this post because it seemed wrong to listen to a Locke Lecture and then not post on it. Philosophical content should be approaching absolute zero, here. But the series must be completed!!

There are some problems with the recording of Brandom's fifth Locke Lecture, "Incompatibility, Modal Semantics, and Intrinsic Logic": The recording of Brandom's lecture cuts out before the end, the appendix he keeps referencing is not included in the handouts online, whoever replied to Brandom was not recorded at all, and Bramdom's reply to them is almost entirely missing. And the Q&A seems to be largely building off of bits of the lecture that didn't get recorded. Less than ideal.

Here's what I was able to get from what was recorded: Brandom thinks that any language-game which allows assertions and denials (any autonomous discursive practice) stands in some special relation to S5 modal logic, and classical logic among non-modal logics. Whatever the details of this are supposed to be is, I take it, explained in the appendix I haven't found. Brandom has some way of going from relations of commitment and entitlement among assertions to relations of compatibility/incompatibility among assertions, and then to modal terms (via set theory?); the modal terms are then used to define negation, conjunction, and logical consequence. The upshot is that negation & pals are supposed to be shown to be treatable without an anterior notion of truth; truth, representation, intensional notions, and intentionality all look to be able to be handled down-stream of practices of "giving and asking for reasons" which don't presume them. I'm not sure what to make of all this, given the level at which Brandom's handling it in this lecture. I think it would help if half the lecture material hadn't disappeared. Or if I'd read "Making It Explicit" ever. I get a feeling that there's something sneaky going on in the way Brandom "validates classical propositional logic" and S5 by introducing logical operators by drawing attention to specific sorts of semantic relations, and this appears to have been brought up in the parts of the lecture I didn't hear, but I can't put my finger on what's bothering me about it.

Here's what I can gather of what went on that wasn't recorded: Bramdom has some idea for what to do with intuitionistic logic, but no idea what to do with relevance logics. Whatever was said in the reply to Brandom here, it caught him off-guard. Brandom thinks this is a problem, but he hadn't thought of it at all before the question & answer section of this lecture. I'm curious what all I missed, here. I suspect that it fell out that Brandom's general strategy for handling logical operators won't work for handling certain non-classical versions of the operators, which is a problem given what Brandom's said earlier about wanting to avoid asking "Which is the true logic?"; I rather liked the latter, so I'm curious about the details of the former. Still one lecture to go; maybe it'll come up again.

And now it's glasses-time.

At one point Haruhi.tv had a hidden page with Mikuru images. That's where this pic is from. When I looked through my image directories, I was surprised to find that it's the only pic I have that's just Mikuru wearing glasses.


Thankfully, there is no shortage of Nagato images where she still has her glasses. <3


No shortage at all.


Plenty of glasses pics to go around.


I decided not to post any NWS ones. It just makes sense. And then it occurred to me that I should really save Yuki pics for future use. Don't want to end up using lame pics just because I want to put up a Yuki one.


I've gotten tired of having to hunt for pics that are small enough for my current template; I've had several that end up getting cut off, anyway. 400 pixels just isn't very wide. So I've resized a lot of pics for this post. But not this one. It was always a little small.


Asakura is love. <3


Why did she have to be killed off? She just wants to murder people to see what happens when she kills them. IS THAT SO WRONG?


I have no idea what any of the text on any of these images says. I actually edited out the text on some of the images I put up in earlier posts, just to avoid accidentally throwing up embarrassing messages unintentionally. Now I am THROWING CAUTION TO THE WIND. For all I know, this image reads "I AM A PEDOPHILE; RON PAUL '08". Or more realistically, it might just say something like "Meganekko Rape Doujin Adult-only 18+". Which, ceteris parabus, is something I'd prefer not to have on my blog. But that is just one of the risks you run from trolling imageboards for pics.


This was one of the only images I had of Tsuruya with glasses. What the hell? Tsuruya and glasses is like peanut butter and celery. Man, I haven't had that in years. I need to eat more vegetables. And buy some peanut butter.


She was a background character in Haruhi. There is fan-art of her. I found at least three or four pieces while selecting pics for this update. Good job, Internet.

Free Image Hosting at www.ImageShack.us
Sometimes the internet frightens and confuses me. Why does this exist? ;_;


Whenever I hear someone say "megane", what comes to mind is a scene from "Ultimate Girls":
Big Breasts (this is actually what they called her; I forget her actual name) was fighting a giant robot/alien mangaka. The mangaka throws a pair of glasses at her, and they land square on her face. Big Breasts is confused by this attack.

Big Breasts: Megane?
Mangaka-alien: Megane-KOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO!

And then he fires a giant laser from his crotch.

Ultimate Girls is one of the worst shows I have ever watched (in full). In my defense, you could view it online for free (legally), and I couldn't get BitTorrent to work at the time. Still, it had things like a magical-girl transformation sequence involving robot ejaculate. That's a special kind of terrible you can really only get from anime.

Free Image Hosting at www.ImageShack.us
And now for some walls
Free Image Hosting at www.ImageShack.us
to close out the post.

05 October 2007

Brandom Again

Just finished off Brandom's fourth Locke Lecture. His interlocutors in the earlier lectures seem to have spoiled this one a bit; there had been questions asked about this lecture from the start. This gave the lecture itself the feel of a review.

Brandom's goal in this lecture is to offer a defense of modal talk (and so of the "modal revolution" -- the fact that no one is anxious about modal vocabulary anymore in the way that Quine et al used to be), but without recourse to the metaphysical bits of Kripke et al. The defense of modal language is tied to a defense of normative language, since Brandom's strategy for making modal language unobjectionable will also work for normative talk.

The claim is attributed to Sellars-Kant (and Brandom notes that he's often accused of not being able to distinguish between Sellars and Hegel) that non-modal, non-normative language is not an autonomous discursive practice; if you can use descriptive language, then you have mastered the skills needed to understand normative and modal talk. On Brandom's inferentialist picture, use of descriptive vocabulary requires acknowledging a difference between good and bad inferences. It is then argued that to be able to distinguish inferences in this way, one must be able to do things which are (in principle) sufficient to allow one to understand modal and normative vocabulary. The proof in the modal case is that revision of one's beliefs is only manageable if one's beliefs are regarded as having various degrees of counterfactual robustness -- otherwise one would face the task of not being able to tell ahead of time whether or not a belief would be likely to need revision in the light of some other belief. The proof in the normative case is that keeping track of inferential relations requires tracking commitments and entitlements, and these are both normative notions. Brandom offers this account as a fleshing-out of Sellars's claims that "the language of modality is a transposed language of norms."

Brandom's project here strikes me as congenial. No criticisms of it leap to mind, nor do I have anything to add by way of commentary. I generally liked the lecture; Brandom may be growing on me.

Huw Price's response, and Brandom's reply to Price's response, focuses mainly on an issue which has been hanging around since lecture one, the desirability of trying to keep the old analytical-metaphysical beast alive; Price regrets that he was reading from an already-prepared lecture in his response, or else he would have stolen McDowell's "Frankenstein" metaphor. Here Brandom makes a wonderful case for his own views, against Price/Rorty; much of the same ground was covered that Duck went over in his wonderful recent post on Truth.

One of the points Price tries to attack Brandom on is "wanting to cross the word-world divide" and go from saying "We can talk of norms and modalities and numbers" to "There really are norms and modalities and numbers." Brandom's reply is exactly to the point -- Price (and Rorty) seem to be arguing for a "subjectivism" in opposition to the older "objectivism", when what really needs doing is a dismantling of the old subject-object/word-world framework. Brandom notes that we should have learned from Frege to think of a fact as merely being a claimable which is true, and so to not be able to understand what it should mean to move from talking of "true claims" to talking of "objective facts" about "the way the world really is". Brandom's pragmatist bona fides are on clear display, here. Good stuff.

This reminds me of a point Duck brought up a while back. To the questions "Is there a world out there, and if so, do the differences and similarities we see in it come from it, from us, or both?" Duck thinks the answer is (trivially) "Yes, and both". I agree that the answer must be trivially "Yes" in the first case, but I don't think I even understand the second. What does "come from" mean, here? I am inclined to say that any similarities or differences we notice are facets of the world which were there before we noticed them*, but of course no one need have noticed them as similarities or differences before we had, and there's no reason to suspect that we immediately notice all distinctions which we might apprehend. I suspect that this is the sort of thing which would be said to quiet someone's urge to ask "Where do the similarities and distinctions we notice come from -- the world or us?", but I really am not sure I understand the temptation to ask this in the first place.

One sour note: During the Q&A Brandom has occasion to speak of Hegel, very briefly. I haven't the foggiest idea how Brandom is reading Hegel as saying what he thinks he's saying; McDowell seems to have the same problem, so I suspect I am confused for good reason. (McDowell's review of Brandom's"Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel's Idealism" is utterly withering.)

*In most cases. When I notice that (say) I am suffering from a stomach-ache, there's no sense in saying that I was already suffering (silently) before anyone noticed. It can't be a proper stomach-ache if I never feel it.

15 September 2007

Artificial Intelligence and Democratic Education

Please note that I have posted some more thoughts on lecture #2 in the comments on the previous post. Also, shawn has had several nice posts recently on "Making It Explicit." Not that I suspect anyone will read this blog who doesn't already read "Words and Other Things" also.

Well, just got done listening to Brandom's third Locke Lecture. I don't know all that much about AI, and I know practically nothing about early childhood education, so I feel like I learned a lot from this. I had no idea that there was a serious problem with teaching fractions as compared to addition; this makes many old "Peanuts" comics even better than they already were. ¦3

I quite liked pretty much everything Brandom had to say about AI, the Turing test, education, and what they have to do with his concern for pragmatics. I'm not sure how much of what he was saying was supposed to be a summary of what everyone "already knew" about the state of the field, and what he was contributing as a novelty, but he acted like he was drawing attention to some neglected topics in computer science; I wouldn't have thought that pragmatics had been so broadly ignored, given the role it plays in the Turing test (we just need an automaton to act indistinguishably from a person to pass the test), but perhaps things are more badly in need of a shake-up than I'd thought.

That one practice was PP-sufficient for another by algorithmic elaboration meant that any creature which could do the first thing could, by following a prescribed algorithm calling for the performance of sub-tasks of the practice already mastered, do the other. It was noted that this is a bit of an idealization if you're trying to apply the model to humans, since there are psychological barriers to responding to certain inputs with certain outputs (even if one is bidden to by an algorithm). Brandom notes that there's a further problem with trying to find a practice which is PP-sufficient by algorithmic elaboration for discursive activity which didn't already presuppose discursive activity, one akin to the "framing problem." When one revises one's beliefs upon a shift somewhere in one's inferential matrix, every element is potentially in need of revision. There needs to be a way of determining what is and what isn't relevant for analysis, but the only way to do this that anyone is aware of requires using language. But, Brandom points out that there is another sort of PP-sufficiency relation we can work with, that of training. Apparently there are actually empirically well-supported algorithms such that anyone who can count can be taught to add -- but not to subtract; still working on that one. I'd be rather interested in reading more about this. This is an addition I didn't see coming; I was not aware that the study of pedagogy had come so far.

I don't have much to say about this lecture; it is simply very solid, enjoyable work. So, to make up for a lack of content: LOLRussell.

Addendum: I have now listened to P. Stekeler-Weithofer's reply, and Brandom's reply-reply, and the following Q&A, and I have to say: I don't have the foggiest idea what P. Stekeler-Weithofer is on about. He seemed to just be going off on tangents for pretty much the entire half-hour (what Hegel's notion of allgemeinheit as opposed to einigkeit, or Heidegger's critique of "humanism" has to do with AI, or with anything Brandom has mentioned, I could not even begin to guess, but P. Stekeler-Weithofer felt compelled to mention both). His criticisms of the Turing test seem entirely to miss the point of the test; it's a way to point out that manufacturing a passable simulacrum is the goal of AI. The claim that you can't know for sure if you're talking to a Turing machine unless you go and find out from the people who made it, and so the Turing test is structurally flawed, strikes me as the stupidest objection to the test that I have ever heard. I will note that Brandom's reply does mention a criticism of the Turing test, but it is not any of the ones P. Stekeler-Weithofer mentioned; I will also note that Brandom's reply was less than ten minutes long, so I am pretty sure I am not alone in thinking that P. Stekeler-Weithofer was a lousy commentator.

On the other hand, I am curious what N.N. will have to say about P. Stekeler-Weithofer's monologue. I know N.N. has some heterodox views on cognitive science, so he might be a more charitable listener than I've been.

13 September 2007

A short note on Brandom's second lecture

John McFarlane's dissertation may not be published, but it is available here*. I'm half-inclined to see if I can rush through it this weekend, then listen to Brandom's second lecture again. I know I was not catching some of what Brandom was trying to say about logic there. It does come out (more explicitly) that the reason behind the PV/VP/PP sufficiency notions is to allow Brandom a way to show that anyone possessing a vocabulary sufficient for assertions possesses the necessary skills for employing logical vocabulary (and, I suspect, modal and normative vocabulary, though these topics are going to be handled in detail in a later lecture).

In lecture-form, it's not clear to me how this proof is supposed to go. Brandom notes that he's privileging assertions, and in general the capacity to give and ask for reasons for what one says (does?), but I'm not sure what his justification for this is. I know that Davidson holds that any language-user must have a concept of truth, since radical interpretation requires us to agree with the speaker about most of what is true (hence they must have thoughts that they hold true). I suspect that Brandom has some argument similar in form to this, but I've just missed it. I don't think Brandom is just privileging assertion because that makes for interesting philosophical work, since he speaks of philosophers being "proud of their logocentrism", of having an answer to Derrida, and of Wittgenstein being wrong that "language has no downtown." He seems to secure this point, though, by ruling some things which seem like language-games (such as the "Slab!" bit from PI 2) as "merely verbal." It is hardly revolutionary to find that, if only certain language-games are real language use, then real language has a "downtown" and that it is not arbitrary to privilege it. This does not seem like a satisfactory answer to Wittgenstein; I'll just set Derrida aside.

One reason I can think of for Brandom to be privileging assertion is that this lets him make bolder claims about the universality of logic: Rather than just being another case (for Brandom thinks there are many) where one vocabulary is PP sufficient for another, logic (and some other vocabularies, I think Brandom calls them "LX") is PP sufficient for any vocabulary. But this is just to say that logic is PP sufficient for any vocabulary which includes assertions as a subset. The universality is just the universality of assertion-vocabulary. Given that the universality of logic seems to be one of the things Brandom wants to explain, this can't be the reason for his privileging of assertions.

N.N. should be glad to hear that Brandom spends quite a bit of time in the Q&A clarifying what he means by "vocabulary"... after offering a "clarification" in the main lecture which he's forced to rather heavily amend. But at least the topic is broached.

I am going to give this lecture (and McFarlane's response) another listen before I move on. I am sure I am missing something important at the moment.

*I should mention that Paul Raymont's "An Idle Threat: Epiphenomenalism Exposed" is great, while I'm linking to that site anyway.

05 September 2007

Brandom's John Locke Lectures Online

Words and Other Things links to Brandom's John Locke Lectures from 2006. So far I've listened to Brandom's first lecture, and McDowell's response. A few scattered thoughts:

Brandom is much easier to listen to than to read. I'd actually seen the John Locke lectures were online before (in text), and got bogged down in the first lecture. Audio's pretty clear, too; I had to crank Winamp to max volume for it to be loud enough, but at least it was intelligible when it was audible. This is often not true of lecture recordings.

I kept wanting Brandom to provide some more examples of his "PV" relations between vocabularies. If he had any examples other than the indexical one (or the merely-alluded-to project of Huw Price, or the Laughing Santa bit), I've missed them. While listening to the lecture I was skeptical of just what McDowell later said he was skeptical of: both the desirability and the possibility of saying "what needs to be done" to count as making use of some particular vocabulary without making use of that very vocabulary (at least in many cases, including all of the interesting ones Brandom mentions). As I recall, this was just what was at issue in McDowell's "In Defense of Modesty" and its sequel, "Another Plea for Modesty", where McDowell was arguing with Dummett about what we should want from a "theory of meaning"; McDowell came out in defense of the adequacy of basically Davidsonian mock-ups (true-in-L and all that) as being perfectly satisfactory for doing what we should want a theory of meaning to do. I am pretty sure these were also some of the essays where McDowell argued with Crispin Wright about the Investigations; Wright seems to be footnoted in every other essay I've read from McDowell's two books. Good stuff.

Another point related to the "Modesty" essays and McDowell's response to Brandom: I can't say I have any idea what Brandom finds attractive in resuscitating "analysis", at least in the handling-one-vocabulary-with-another sense in which he wants to breath new life into the beast. Various attempts at this have certainly produced interesting creatures in analytic philosophy (and in philosophy in general, reduction being not a recent invention), but I can't say I can think of any cases where the undertaking has proved successful. Nor am I sure why we should lust after such a success when the empiricist and naturalist projects are dead (which Brandom takes them to be).

Brandom mentions the AI functionalism program (which he, rightly, thinks is a hugely important part of the trajectory analytic philosophy's taken in the past century). I suspect that one of the big "pay-offs" for Brandom's project is supposed to be that it shows how we can get an automaton to use intentional vocabulary (or at least get an automaton to use some interesting sort of vocabulary). If so, I suspect that seeing why Brandom's attempt fails might be illuminating for seeing why functionalism should join empiricism and naturalism on the scrapheap of the twentieth century. (If Brandom's attempt does not fail, then hey, get some engineers clued in and start cranking out R2 units and positronic brains.)

I am inclined to think that the success of something like Brandom's program is not needed for AI (or whatever the current descendants of AI are calling themselves). If robots aren't "really" capable of using some vocabulary or other (in that they don't do what we do when we use that vocabulary), but can do a fair enough job of passing for doing so, then I don't know what is supposed to go wanting. If a vocabulary which an automaton can understand is not PV sufficient for some vocabulary V, this doesn't mean we can't construct an automaton such that we comport ourselves naturally with it as if it had mastered vocabulary V. Which is good enough for government work. Conversely, I don't think AI work is going to lead to any amazing revelations about human psychology; if we get a robot that can mimic some aspect of human behavior, there's no reason to think it's doing the "same thing" we do when we behave in the relevant manner in the sense that we can use our deeper understanding of the robot we made to understand how humans work. It may very well be "doing the same thing" in the sense that we comport ourselves with the robot as if it were, say, asserting that the weather's turning grim, but there "analysing" what the robot is doing when asserting won't be any easier (or more productive) than analysing what a human does.

Brandom does seem to have some sort of argument to the effect that any discourse which supports assertion (and some other things I'm forgetting) will have to support modal terms, and normative terms, as well. That might be interesting. I still feel the hairs on my neck raise when modal talk comes up; it still looks suspicious to me. Don't trust the stuff more than I have to. I'm fine with "necessarily", "possibly", "maybe" et al as ways to modify the strength of one's doxastic commitments on a particular point; I suspect that something more sinister than this is often afoot. But perhaps I just haven't had cause to need to speak of necessity, and if I do then I'll warm up to those strange little boxes and diamonds.

I've noticed that McDowell quotes Wittgenstein (chapter & verse) rather often when writing (or speaking) about him. I notice that Brandom's longest actual quote from Wittgenstein is "look to the use" or "language is a motley", and I do not believe he gave the citations; generally, the only direct liftings from Wittgenstein are two- or three-word slogans. Brandom also notes that what he gets from Wittgenstein is something Wittgenstein wouldn't have found interesting or worthwhile, and which he would not want to encourage in others. On the plus side, at least Brandom is self-conscious about the fact that his reading has to be seriously, seriously wrong about what Wittgenstein is getting at -- not that he seems to care. I suspect N.N. got annoyed at these bits of the lecture.

I should probably listen to Brandom's reply to McDowell's reply while it is still fresh in my mind, but I should also have started the reading for Property about two hours ago. Hopefully writing a little something helps me to recall what the devil I just spent two hours listening to.

It would certainly be nice for the John Locke lectures to get more attention in general.

I need to get a copy of the current issue of Inquiry. McDowell responding to Dreyfus's APA address sounds awesome and is exactly the sort of thing I want to see happen over and over again.

Huh, I have somehow spent almost an hour and a half tooling around with this post. Hopefully the Property reading's short! ;_;