I have not been good at blogging recently; I have neglected comments for about a year, and have written nothing. Apologies to those who I did not respond to (which by my records include Daniel Nagase, N.N., Charles Wolverton, Evan Kuehn, and Duck; I could make excuses for this bad behavior, but they would be of merely psychological importance, and that's a poor way to start a Frege post).
But if I cannot manage to blog well, then I should at least blog badly more often; here then are things I typed to try to get clear to myself on what Rödl is getting from the Dummett essay he leans on in the first chapter of "Categories of Temporality".
In "The Context Principle: Centre of Frege's Philosophy" Dummett claims that Frege tried to use the context principle to justify his "realism", his treatment of numbers as objects, while simultaneously using it to answer the question of how numbers can be given to us ("epistemologically", in Dummett's term). Dummett's idea is that Frege tried to answer this question (and establish his realism) by fixing the truth-values of every sentence in which a number-word appeared; in the Grundgesetze, this is fixing the truth-value of every sentence in which a term for a value-range appears.
The line of thought seems to be this:
1. Frege can fix the truth-values of sentences by (in part) stipulation, going through each possible combination of a value-range term with a primitive concept-term and assuring that it has a truth-value.
2. For Frege truth-values are the Bedeutungen of sentences.
3. The context principle: the Bedeutung of a subsentential term is determined only by the way it contributes to the Bedeutungen of the sentences it appears in.
Which gives Dummett's Frege the conclusion that by stipulating truth-values for each (atomic) sentence in which a value-range term appears, he has also settled what the Bedeutungen of value-range terms are.
Dummett contrasts this to a way of providing terms with Bedeutungen which would go against the context principle: first establish the domain over which the variables of the language can range, and then determine for each term of the language which needs a Bedeutung which of the items from that domain is to be its Bedeutung. As this initial domain-determination requires a grasp of the possible values of variables anterior to the securing of Bedeutungen to the sentences of the language in which those variables appear, it violates Dummett's version of the context principle.
Dummett spends some time on the objection that one might ascend to a metalanguage to avoid this violation of the context principle: if the domain-determination for the object language takes place in sentences of another language, then the context principle is not sinned against. But Dummett argues that Frege did not mean to be giving Bedeutungen to the terms of Begriffschrift which were already understood by anyone who could read his German: this would make some of Frege's prose a necessary element of his logic, which Frege clearly wants to avoid. The Begriffschrift is supposed to stand on its own, with the German prose serving only as a propaedeutic to its understanding; in particular, if the question of whether numbers are objects or how they may be given to us is to be solved by the Grundgesetze project, then it cannot rely on the German-reader's already knowing these objects and including them in the domains over which Begriffschrift variables are allowed to range.
Dummett's objection to Frege here is put rather tersely, and I am writing this post because I need to do some work to unpack it for myself: "The fallacy appeared at the very first step. The stipulations governing the primitive functors [what I called concept-words, above], including the criterion of identity for value-ranges embodied in Axiom V, could be determinate only if the domain, consisting wholly or largely of value-ranges, was determinate; but the domain was in the process of being determined by fixing the Bedeutungen of the value-range terms, and so the procedure went round in a circle." (p.18)
The circle seems to be this: Frege tries to establish that among the objects are value-ranges (the Bedeutungen of value-range terms) by stipulating truth-values for each atomic sentence which results from combining a value-range term and a primitive function of Begriffschrift. But the sentences which are here stipulated to have truth-values can only have truth-values if the domains over which their variables range is determinate; an indeterminacy in the domain means an indeterminacy in what can count as the sentence being true or false, and Frege's stipulations do not settle this question about domains. In fact, Frege wants to settle questions about domains by securing Bedeutungen for his primitive terms, so that he can settle the question of whether numbers are objects, and how numbers can be given to us, by making clear how sentences featuring number-words function in inference. So he both needs to settle the domain issue prior to his procedure and only by means of it, which is contradictory. This is why he is able to think he has given Bedeutungen to all of his Begriffschrift expressions such that all of his Basic Laws are true, when in fact they are jointly inconsistent (because of Basic Law V, whose Bedeutung was supposed to be settled by the procedure of securing Bedeutungen for value-range terms).
Dummett's verdict here is despair. His closing paragraph:
"The realist interpretation could be jettisoned without abandoning the context principle itself, but only if that principle, as here understood, can be shown to be coherent; and this remains in grave doubt. And yet it is hard to see how it can be abandoned, so strong is the motivation for it. The alternative is an apprehension of objects, including abstract objects, underlying, but anterior to, an understanding of reference to them, or, indeed, a grasp of thought about them; and this is a form of [what Putnam calls] external realism too coarse to be entertained. I am therefore forced to conclude without either endorsing the central feature of Frege's philosophy or rejecting it; I can do no more than to say lamely that the issue if one whose resolution is of prime importance to philosophy." (p.19)
This is where Rödl intervenes: he claims that the context principle can be saved (and should be saved), but only by rejecting the idea that a logic such as the Begriffschrift can be said to present us with the form of thought as such. As Dummett argued, a coherent version of Frege requires something other than Begriffschrift to settle the question of what objects Begriffschrift is about; Begriffschrift cannot take care of itself, but needs the "pinch of salt" Frege infamously asks his readers for. The distinguishing characteristic of Begriffschrift Rödl picks out for blame here is that Begriffschrift expressions are characterized only by their inferential structure: a Begriffschrift expression is to have its meaning fixed solely by determining how it figures in lines of a Begriffschrift proof. This is what Frege really fixes by his procedures: how Begriffschrift expressions are to be used in constructing Begriffschrift proofs. But Rödl claims that this fails to settle the question of how Begriffschrift expressions relate to their objects, for the reasons Dummett gave: and this is why Frege fails to notice that his logic cannot take care of itself, as part of what determines the thoughts expressible in Begriffschrift is the relation of these thoughts to their objects, and not merely the relations of these thoughts to each other, and this is why Frege fails to determine thoughts expressible in Begriffschrift in the way he believed he had. So the form of thought as such cannot simply be an inferential order, but must already determine the relation of thoughts to their objects in a way that Frege's logic did not.
The option Dummett's despair overlooks is that of determining the truth-values of sentences not in a way anterior to their relatedness to their objects, but only by already having in view these sentences' relatedness to their objects. Dummett's Frege erred in trying to secure relatedness to objects only indirectly, by means of securing the inferential functions of thoughts, and Dummett as sees the only alternative to secure the relatedness to objects of thoughts to be that of grasping thoughts and objects independently and then bringing them together (in some medium other than thought, which yet stands in need of relatedness to objects). Rödl's excluded third alternative is to promote a logic which determines thoughts only as already related to objects which are given by these thoughts: such a logic is what Kant called "transcendental logic". Kant distinguished this from the sort of logic he infamously claimed to have been settled since Aristotle, which he characterized as a "general logic" that abstracts from all objects of thought and deals with modes of inference independently of the relatedness of thoughts to any objects (which is why for Kant general logic can lead to transcendent metaphysical thoughts by means of fallacious inferences, but transcendental logic does not give any "Sinn oder Bedeutung" to the "thoughts" of transcendent metaphysics).
To present a transcendental logic is to present a logic which includes within it an account of the objects which can be given to thought; non-transcendental logic can omit this only because it treats of thoughts without inquiring into their relatedness to objects. If a logic is not to leave the question of the relatedness of thougts to their objects outside of itself (as a topic for something other than logic), i.e. if a logic is to take care of itself, to be able to present the form of thought as such, then the objects which are given in thoughts must be treated of by logic itself: thus transcendental logic must be metaphysics. This is just what we find in Kant: the Transcendental Logic is just where Kant establishes the principles of his "metaphysics which is to come forth as a science", that all appearances are substances undergoing lawful changes in mutual interaction etc. As general logic determines the forms of thoughts which are capable of figuring into inference, so transcendental logic determines the forms of thoughts of objects: and so it determines the ways in which objects may be given to us, the way in which objects which can be given to us may (or must) be. And unless there is a distinction made between objects which can be given to thought and objects which can be given to our thought, transcendental logic will not have as a consequence transcendental idealism: if the metaphysics of transcendental logic determines how objects must be to be given to thought, then to speak of objects which are not (or might not be) thus is to speak of something contradictory, or to put forward a thought which has no relation to any object: thus it cannot have as its object any "thing in itself" which is unknowable by thought. Kant's transcendental idealism arises because of his accounting our form of sensibility as not the only logically possible one: hence his transcendental logic does not present the form of objects which can be given to thought, but only the form of objects which can be given to spatiotemporally-formed thinkers; the "thing in itself" thus remains as something which (as far as logic allows) might be given to thought, but cannot be given to our thought, and so is for us unknowable and undetermined by Kant's metaphysics. If Kant's forms of sensibility can be shown to be the only logically possible ones, to be demanded by transcendental logic and not merely an addition from a "transcendental aesthetic", or if Kant can be shown to have erred in his claiming that the (logically contingent) forms of space and time are the forms of our sensibility, then Kant's transcendental idealism can be excised from his system. This is part of Rödl's project, in line with earlier German Idealists such as Ficthe and Hegel: to carry out transcendental logic without an independent transcendental aesthetic, so as to avoid transcendental idealism and the "thing in itself". They do not reject the division between transcendental logic and transcendental aesthetic because of ignorance of the importance of a transcendental aesthetic, of an account of the form of objects which can be given to thought, but because they seek to have transcendental logic alone provide for it, as it should be able to if transcendental logic is a logic which can take care of itself.
18 May 2013
Dummett's Frege and Rödl
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28 October 2012
A Quote from L.E.J. Brouwer
"Life is a magic garden. With miraculously soft shining flowers, but amidst the flowers the little people walk, that I am so afraid of, they stand on their heads, and the worst is, that they cry out to me that I must also stand on my head, now and then I try it, and I burn with shame; but sometimes the little people then shout that I do it very well, and that I am after all a real gnome too. But under no circumstances are they going to make me believe that."
From a letter to Carel Adama van Scheltema, August 7, 1906. Cited here.
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28 September 2012
Blanking on Rödl
From today's NDPR review of "The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy":
Although this seems on its surface to suggest a possible link between Goethe's idea, at least generally taken, and the more recent work by Michael Thompson and Sebastian Rödl on how species terms work, Förster does not explore that link. On the other hand, one can't do everything.What work by Rödl does Pinkard have in mind? I thought Rödl just pointed to "The Representation of Life" when he needed to talk about species terms; am I just forgetting somewhere that Rödl does the work for himself? Or is Pinkard mistaken in thinking that Rödl is relevant on just this point? (His work is clearly something that should be sat next to Förster's book as a whole, so I'm glad he got mentioned in the review. But I don't see why he got mentioned just here.)
On Facebook, Ben Wolfson pointed to chapter six of "Categories of Temporality", but that doesn't satisfy me: Rödl doesn't talk about animal species as such very much there, and in any case he points to Thompson a few times in that book (all three parts of "Life and Action" are in his bibliography), so Pinkard's sentence still feels weird.
Another possibility that occurs to me is that Pinkard meant to point to Rödl's discussion of "species" in the logical sense (the things under a genus), in which case chapter six of "Categories of Temporality" is clearly relevant. But then mentioning Thompson seems odd: I can't think of any work of his which is that general, as opposed to work on "species" as a type of life-form.
I feel like I'm just forgetting something Rödl's written.
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21 September 2012
"Thinking"
I needed to write some things; I have checked none of my quotations (and give no citations because of it), and am too lazy to italicize where it needs doing etc.; anyone who reads this is advised that they do so only under their own judgement, and I foreswear all responsibility for such actions.
"Only in the context of a proposition has a word really a meaning" Frege tells us; this is the stronger formulation used in the middle of the Grundlagen, after his initial, more cautious warning "Never to ask for the meaning of a word except in the context of a proposition", for fear that what we will confuse with the meaning is an "idea", a subjective Vorstellung which comes to mind when a word is heard but is orthogonal to any question of meaning.
The author of the Tractatus tells us much the same: "Only in the context of a proposition has a name meaning"; only in a proposition can there be a symbol. Outside of the context of a proposition, we have only things which we can confuse with signs: but as a sign is "the perceptible aspect of a symbol", a blot of ink or a noise which is not presently symbolizing is not even a sign. To see the symbol in a sign, we must consider the context of significant use: this means that if we are considering a putative sign in such a way that we can think of it just as we are without its having a context of significant use, then we are not thinking of even a sign: we have only ink or noise, and these have no innate connection to any symbols (for signification is arbitrary).
So, if there is a context in which we are supposed to refer to a sign in a way that is independent of that sign being used, we in fact refer to no sign: we mention only ink or noise, or something else which may (or may not) be arbitrarily connected with a meaning in some further use of it as a symbol. Such a thing cannot have any meaning.
There are many ways to use a symbol: this is demanded by what the author of the Tractatus thinks of as the "bipolarity" of a proposition, its ability to be true or false. If we cannot use the same symbols to say both a true thing and a false thing (with the aid of a sign for negation, or by denying where someone has affirmed) then we lose this bipolarity: the same symbols need to be able to function in both affirmation and denial in the same ways for a given thought to be held as true and held as false. So logic demands that there be ways to modify the force of a proposition, to use Frege's terminology.
Perhaps the same point, perhaps a better one than I just made: "Thaetetus" must be the same symbol in "Thaetetus sits" and in "Thaetetus flies" for the inferences in which these propositions are involved to be intelligible. So there arises the illusion that we can speak of the meaning of "Thaetetus" in these propositions on its own, so that we can after all speak of the meaning of a word outside of the context of a proposition. It seems we have just done so, by putting "Thaetetus" in quotation marks: by doing this we are now talking about the symbol which is combined with other symbols in propositions, but without its being combined in any particular proposition.
I think this must be seeing things wrong.
Rather than saying that in ""Thaetetus" refers to Thaetetus" we refer to a name (or that in the longer quoted expression I just used we refer to a sentence), we might say that we use "Thaeteus" with a modified force: where normally "Thaeteus" symbolizes only in some such proposition as "Thaeteus sits" or "Thaetetus flies", the quotation marks around ""Thaetetus"" cancel the force of the rest of the proposition, for all of the propositions in which "Thaeteus" has a use: thus we do not use quotation marks to refer to something which might exist before any proposition, but to refer to something which exists only in abstraction from propositions. Not: A name has a reference, and can be combined with other words to form a sentences, but: A sentence has names in it, which can be picked out in it and seen in other sentences. The use of quotation marks around an expression thus depend on that expression already having a use in the language, to use them in the way they are ordinarily used in logic and semantics. So this way of using "Thaeteus" is not using it outside of the context of a proposition, but it using it in the context of propositions which are bracketed out: not outside of a context of significant use, but in a different context of significant use which is parasitic on those contexts. "Thaeteus" is not something we can mention which has a meaning by itself, but is something we can mention as having its meaning in this-and-that proposition which we leave unstated (but could state examples of).
This is contrary to the manner in which artificial languages are constructed (as in Carnap), where we distinguish between the introduction of atomic signs and the rules for formation of sentences from the combination of atomic signs (and from other sentences). This gives the appearance that we can have something logical in view before the final proposition-in-a-context-of-significant-use is given, that we can build up one of these out of some things understandable antecedently.
Carnap is one of the inventors of metalogic; he reads into the Tractatus a notion of "a language" which is at home in his own work on metalogic, where a "language" is something we can have in view without presently using it (as its use is external to it: a formal language is in itself a system of manipulable marks, and can be manipulated or not as we please). The Tractatus has no such notion: its author is not teaching us about a formal language, but about a method of rewriting the propositions of ordinary language, which is for its author "the only language I can understand". (Thus we do not need to saddle this author with the view that every language has the same expressive power, that all languages are intertranslatable: his Begriffschrift is not meant to be a language which has the powers of all languages, but to be a style of notation which can serve to rewrite any language. The notation itself does not need to have expressive powers in the way that the languages it is used to rewrite do: anyone who wants to rewrite something in the notation of the Tractatus can make use of whatever sorts of (e.g.) names his own language gives him, and doesn't need a Begriffschrift to supply him with any.)
When working with a formal language which resembled ordinary language, we can mistake a sentence of the formal language (which exists only according to the arbitrary dictates of the formal system in which it is produced) with a sentence of ordinary language which superficially resembles it: we can then imagine that our ordinary language is what this formal language has created, forgetting that the formal language is a free creation of a particular subject and no ordinary language can be this. ("The only language which I understand" cannot be something I produce by a free act, for I must already understand it to formulate any such end for myself.) "Formal language" and "ordinary language" have only a sign in common, and the author of the Tractatus reminds us that this is of no logical import.
(It is probably important that Davidson rejects Tarski's theory of quotation marks in the Warheitsbegriff as an error, and has to replace it to apply Tarski's definition of truth to natural languages; I would have to look at Tarski again to remember what his view actually was.)
This way of thinking goes along with thinking that the rules of "logical syntax" are constitutive of thought, not normative for it: we cannot violate them. Thus there cannot be an impermissible combination of signs, for to speak of "permission" makes no sense here. In not being able to violate these rules, we are not prohibited from thinking anything; outside of the limits of thought there is simply nonsense: not something which we are prohibited from thinking. (I am not happy with any formulation of this I can think of. This is perhaps an important point about the constitutive-normative distinction in these areas, that formulations of either sort of view can be taken as formulations of the other.)
In logic we can never do something we shouldn't do, but only misunderstand what we are doing. We can only mistake something other than logic for logic, as Frege warned us about; but Frege's rule to always sharply distinguish the logical and the psychological does not go far enough, for there are other troubles than psychologism to worry about. (Frege perhaps falls into a confusion of logic and language when he looks for the referents of concept-expressions, as both names and concept-expressions are written in words.) Or perhaps: we all too easily underestimate what it is that is "psychological" as opposed to logical: not just the subjective play of Vorstellungen is opposed to the logical. "Logical" is perhaps not a term that wears the pants, as Austin said of "real".
I have no idea if I'm going anywhere (with this?). I want to say: I am a mass of errors, and can do nothing but err. Is there a context of significant use in which such "philosophy" as I produce has a sense, or is this too nothing but confusion? (That there is not is suggested by the fact that this question strikes me as sophistry: but I feel it forced upon me by my own thinking, which is also tarred as sophistry by this association, and so the question seems to have force: and on in circles I go.)
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16 September 2012
Sellars Society Interview
The Sellars Society has started an interview series; it's off to a good start.
Aside: As I expected, this semester has me too busy to blog; I get to start grading midterms tomorrow. It's been an unrewarding grind so far, and thinking for fun hasn't seemed like much fun because of it. Hopefully the spring is better.
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10 September 2012
Hooray for C.I. Lewis!
This post is nothing but cheering for the guy I like winning a thing.
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15 August 2012
Förster's examples of Idea, transitions, and individuals
Following on from where my previous post left off, here is Förster, in "The Twenty Five Years of Philosophy":
First example: Let's suppose we are watching a modern, 'experimental' film in which the scenes follow each other in a seemingly random, unconnected way: Times, places, and actors are constantly changing with no indication of how they are connected. It seems as if every scene constituted an independent and self-contained episode. Then comes the final scene, and suddenly everything that came before is illuminated in a flash. This final scene provides the key to understanding the film and allows us to recognize the idea that the director wanted to present. Now we might perhaps wish to see the film for a second time, and then something decisive occurs: Although we see exactly the same scenes again, this time we see every scene differently. When we watch the film again, the last scene or rather our knowledge of the film's underlying idea is now present in every single scene. And it now makes clear how the scenes which formerly appeared to be unconnected are in fact internally linked.Two things to immediately note about this example: Förster is explicit that whether a whole consists of an Idea and a series of individuals with Ideal transitions between them is posited, a mere "if", and not a given. And in the particular example, we are merely told that we "recognize the idea that the director wanted to present", which implies there was one in this case. It seems questionable whether even every "modern, 'experimental' film" has an Idea, a single "thing" which could illuminate every transition between scenes, and very doubtful that all films do. (What is the Idea manifested in Return of the Jedi?)
In this example we are at first, i.e., after seeing the film for the first time, given all the parts (scenes) of a whole as well as the underlying idea, but we are not yet given the internal link, the 'transitions' between the scenes. With the aid of the idea, however, we can produce or reconstruct these transitions for ourselves after a second viewing. This suggests that if a whole consists of these three elements and two of them are given, then I can infer the third element from them. We could put this to the test if for example, differently than in the case of the film, we imagine a case in which the idea and the transitions are given, but the parts still have to be found....(p.258-259)
Now, even granting to Förster that the film he asks us to imagine does have an Idea present in it, his presentation seems optional. He needs us to think of the process as follows:
1. I first see each scene in sequence, and do not understand them.
2. I see the final scene, and now grasp the Idea of the film.
3. I watch the film again.
4. While doing this, I see each scene along with the transitions between it and its surrounding scenes, according to its Idea.
But why should we think of it that way, rather than as follows:
1. I first see each scene in sequence, and do not understand them.
2. I see the final scene, and now, in recollection, understand the scenes that preceded it.
3. I watch the film again.
4. While doing this, I confirm that my recollection was faithful to the film: the final scene did in fact allow me to understand how the earlier scenes hung together.
This seems to me more faithful to how watching that sort of movie actually works: the understanding of the whole comes in a flash, as Förster says -- but in his explication of this, he divides the "flash" into an initial moment of "grasping an Idea" and then later "understanding the transitions between scenes". Förster's own characterization betrays the artificiality of this divide: as he notes, "we might perhaps wish to see the film a second time", which makes sense if the second viewing is merely confirmatory.
To concretize this a bit: Memento seems like a decent example of the sort of film Förster has in mind. Although it's not as apparently incoherent as the film he describes, it is a film which is really understood only once its final scenes have been seen: before then, the viewer has a wildly false idea of the reality of the film. But I didn't need to see the film twice to get this effect: the correction of my view of the reality of the film came alongside the viewing of the final scenes themselves. It seems false, "phenomenologically", to say that my grasping of "the Idea of Memento" and my seeing how the earlier scenes hung together were two distinct acts of the mind. So I can't grant that this example shows what Förster wants it to show, that if two elements (of Idea/sequence/transitions) are given, I can "infer" the third. The example doesn't seem to have the sort of division he needs it to have between elements two and three, the Idea and the transitions.
And now on to the
Second example: A psychiatrist interested in philosophy delves ever more deeply into the intellectual world of Nietzsche. Because of his profession, he take a special interest in Nietzsche's insanity and its causes. Time and again he wonders how it might have been if Nietzsche could have undergone psychoanalysis. Since his illness took place in the period in which psychoanalysis was first developed, the thought is not unrealistic. It gradually grows into the idea for a novel: 'Nietzsche in Therapy'. However: everything we know about Nietzsche indicates that he himself would never have agreed to undergo therapy. How, then, is the idea to be realized? Our author conceives the following plan: In the story, Nietzsche, who was very proud of his deep psychological insights, has to be convinced that it is he himself who has to give therapy to someone since only he, Nietzsche, can help that person, whereas in reality and without Nietzsche's being aware of the fact, the 'patient' is the psychiatrist and Nietzsche himself is the object of the therapy. To this end, one of Nietzsche's friends (Lou Salome), who is deeply worried about his mental health, persuades a doctor with whom she is acquainted (Josef Breuer, Freud's mentor), to take part in the scheme and present himself as the 'patient'. With this a narrative framework is in place which connects the beginning, middle and end of the story and become a central thread, making transitions possible between the individual scenes. The only thing still missing are the scenes themselves -- the different parts of the narrative in which the idea is to be realized. But now they can be 'found' in light of what is already given: they have to be realistic scenes in the sense that they are not only to reflect the locality and the Viennese milieu in the period when psychoanalysis was originally developed, but also to draw on Nietzche's biography in such a way that a fictional narrative about Nietzsche comes about and not about someone who would bear no resemblance to the philosopher.Förster notes that this premise of the bestseller "When Nietzsche Wept", by Irvin Yalom.
Whereas in the film example the parts and the idea were given and the transitions were to be discovered on their basis, in this second example the idea and the transitions (the 'central thread') are given and it is the parts which have to be found. Can we then also imagine a third case in which the parts and the transitions are given and the idea is to be discovered on their basis? Here I no longer need to construct an example, for this is exactly the case that Goethe seeks to solve with the help of his morphological method: all the parts ('the complete series') and the attentive observation of the transitions between them are to provide a basis for studying the idea underlying the whole. Here, too, I require two elements in order to find the third. (p.259-260)
This example I find implausible on its face. Förster needs this example to work as follows:
1. Yalom has the Idea of a novel about Nietzsche undergoing psychoanalysis.
2. Yalom thinks of the "central thread" of the novel, which connects the novel's beginning, middle, and end.
3. These suffice to provide Yalom with the individual scenes depicted in the novel.
But 3 is simply implausible: After one has an idea for a novel, and even has a fairly detailed idea about how the plot will go and what gets the reader from the beginning through the middle to the end, actually writing the novel is a lot of additional work. The scare-quotes Förster puts around "'found'" cannot be removed; there really is not a finding of the words, as they must be created. If the process was as simple as Förster here implies, there would be no need for drafting and editing this novel: the Idea and the transitions ("the guiding thread") were had before a single word was put on paper, and they are supposed to suffice for the finished product, so how can the composition itself be more than a mechanical affair? So I can't grant Förster that this example shows that you can go from the two elements of "Idea" and "transitions" to the sequence in which the Idea is manifested.
For such a transition to be plausible at all in this example, the "central thread" of the novel which is supposed to be in Yalom's mind before it is written would have to be so detailed as to lay out exactly how to write the novel, in a way sufficient to issue in a publishable result. But then Förster's point would still not follow, for then it would appear that the transitions and the scenes themselves were already had, and there is no transition from two elements to a third. More problematically, it would appear here that the transitions and the scenes meld into one another, as in the first example the transitions and the Idea melded into one another: to make the example realistic, the three elements dissolve into two.
So, neither of Förster's examples seems to me to show what he needs, that one can transition between two of the elements Idea/transitions/sequence to the third. Either the transition is impossible, or there is no real transition from two to three.
Extending these complaints to his third example (which he doesn't need to produce an example for), I find myself with the following suspicion/complaint: Rather than a transition from a sequence and the transitions between its members to knowledge of an Idea, Goethe presents us only with either
1) a man who surveys the members of a sequence as transitioning between moments of an Idea; or
2) a man who surveys members of a sequence and notes connections between them, and then (groundlessly) posits an Idea underlying them; or (most charitably)
3) a man who surveys members of a sequence and notes connections between them (rhapsodically, as it were), and then begins to survey them as transitioning between the moments of an Idea.
In the first case, Goethe is no help to we who wish to acquire scientia intuitiva: we are only assured that he has it, and are not helped to gain it by this assurance.
In the second case, the very possibility of scientia intuitiva is left doubtful, and Goethe's example is no help.
In the third case, we are given a model we can imitate (unlike the first), and which leads to scientia intuitiva (unlike the second), but not in sufficient detail to know how. Against Förster's desires, there is no transition from two elements to a third: there is a transition from two elements, not seen as elements of a triple, to seeing three elements as elements of a triple. What is needed for the transition is not the elements themselves, but the elements grasped correctly: and this is done only with all of the elements available for viewing.
So, regarding the question of the reality of the (absolute) Idea, I see no help for Förster in his examples.
On an unrelated note: My semester is starting again, so blogging will probably dry up for a while again. But at least this time I posted all I had meant to post on Förster's book -- which I still think very highly of, and recommend to all my readers.
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Susan Lindquist
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